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How Carlos Ghosn’s Case Failed to Highlight a Fundamental Aspect 
of the Japanese Pre-trial Detention System
Silvia CROYDON
1. Introduction
The recent arrest and detention of the Nissan Corporation’s charismatic foreign executive, 
Carlos Ghosn, has placed the Japanese criminal justice system under the spotlight. A great many 
reports have been written on the topic of his detention at Tokyo Detention Center, which has so far 
lasted over four months. Questions have been asked, such as: Is this lengthy period of deprivation 
of liberty justifi ed for a man who has not been proven guilty in a court of law? Should the “risk of 
fl ight and evidence concealment“, which are the reasons cited by the Tokyo District Court to refuse 
Ghosn bail, render him a prisoner until trial, even if a trial might not happen for some months? 
What makes it legitimate to prioritize investigation over legal counsel (as happened at the outset of 
Ghosn’s detention) and contact with family? How many hours a day is he being questioned by the 
prosecution and is he given a break when he falls ill? What are the physical conditions under which 
he is held, such as the size and temperature of his cell and the food he is given?
As most observers would be aware, Ghosn’s treatment so far within the Japanese criminal 
justice process has provoked many of his supporters abroad, amongst whom diplomats and top-level 
government representatives, to condemn the Japanese criminal justice system. Japanese offi cials, on 
their part, have also not shied away from responding to these condemnations, with the dialogue thus 
formed starting to resemble the exchanges made at the end of 19th century when the suitability and 
fi tness of the Japanese criminal justice system for trying and penalizing Westerners was debated. 
The 29th November 2018 press conference in Tokyo given by the second in rank at the Tokyo Public 
Prosecution’s Offi ce, Shin Kukimoto, summarized in relatively subdued terms what had preceded: 
Kukimoto objected to criticisms of Ghosn’s detention by saying that there is nothing problematic 
about it, since it is based on a court warrant, as required under the current law. He added that even 
though foreign media condemn the length of the detention, “the [criminal justice] system of each 
country is refl ective of the latter’s [unique] history and culture, so just because another country’s 
system is different, it does not mean that an outright criticism of it is justifi ed”1).
Whilst it seems astonishing that 120 years have not been enough for this dialogue to run its 
course, what is further pertinent to note is that the recent scrutiny of the Japanese detention system 
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has failed to engage with its arguably most defi nitive characteristic. This is the fact that, unlike the 
high-profi le case of Ghosn where, upon arrest by the Special Investigation Department of the Public 
Prosecutor’s Offi ce, he was sent to the Ministry of Justice (MOJ)-run Tokyo Detention Center, the 
vast majority of suspects, or 98% of them more precisely, are detained for the entire period prior to 
indictment (sometimes with multiple arrests imposed one after another upon them) in the cells of 
police stations – the average length of such detention being 26 days.
The reason why such prolonged detention in police facilities could be seen as problematic is 
because of the confl ict of interest inherent in the investigator controlling every aspect of the life 
of the suspect. Even if the police offi cer or prosecutor in charge does not mean to intimidate the 
suspect and coerce them to confessing to something they have not done, in their passion to resolve 
the case, they are susceptible to unwittingly crossing the line between questioning and abuse. This is 
particularly true when investigators are given the opportunity to examine the suspect uninterrupted 
behind closed doors for weeks on end. 
The present article aims to bring to light this feature of the Japanese system for suspect 
detention, which, by virtue of affecting so many, could be said to be one of the defi ning components 
of the country’s criminal justice as a whole. By highlighting that most pre-indictment detention in 
Japan happens on the premises of the police stations, the present article seeks to put the discussions 
about the authority of the investigation in Japan on more concrete and empirical footing than has 
hitherto been the case. Indeed, whilst the strength of the investigative authority in Japan has been 
the object of attention by a great number of scholars (most notably, Haley 1991; Foote 1992; 
Johnson 2001), how that authority is implemented on the ground and what facilitating framework 
there might exist to allow those state organs to hold the sway that they do has evaded attention.
The article will begin by outlining the content of the relevant legal statutes, introducing a little-
known provision that authorizes the substitution of detention centers for police station cells. It is 
by recourse to this provision that suspects are detained in police premises for the length of time 
cited above. The article will then describe briefl y the history of the provision in question and how 
the actual practice emerged in the post-Occupation era. Upon this historical overview, and before 
concluding by making further observations on the ongoing debates triggered by Ghosn’s detention, 
the major stakeholder’s attitudes towards this facility-substitution system will be outlined.
2. Explaining the Detention of the Average Suspect in Japan
2. 1. The Legal Statutes
The criminal investigation process starts with the apprehension of the suspect, which unless 
in case of emergency or when the culprit is caught red-handed, is undertaken on an arrest warrant 
issued in advance by a judge. Once so confi ned, the suspect could spend up to 72 hours in police 
269Protecting the Equilibrium of Japan’s Criminal Justice System: How Carlos Ghosn’s Case Failed to Highlight
a Fundamental Aspect of the Japanese Pre-Trial Detention System
station cells (ryūchi shisetsu) (with the first 48 hours of detention being undertaken under the 
jurisdiction of the police itself, and the remaining 24 hours under that of the prosecution). If the 
prosecutor wishes to extend the custody past this initial limit, there is a legal requirement upon them 
to bring the suspect to a court of law and petition for their continuous detention. The decision as 
to whether this is necessary and justifi ed is up to a judge, who is under legal obligation to hear the 
suspect’s own defence at this point. Some of the reasons that compel judges to grant the prosecutor 
a detention warrant include: reasonable grounds for suspecting involvement in the crime; fl ight-risk 
(e.g. in cases where a permanent address is not established in Japan or multiple passports are held); 
and, a possibility for obstructing the investigation of the case, as in tampering with evidence or 
talking to witnesses and accomplices and persuading them to change their statements.
The legal requirement that upon seizure the investigative authorities bring the suspect promptly 
to a court, as opposed to continuing to hold him/her without recourse to a neutral organ, is a foreign 
import in Japan. Such clauses were established for the first time in medieval Europe and their 
inclusion in the legal books has ever since been regarded as a hallmark of civilization. Known as 
habeas corpus2)  clauses in legal circles, these statutes have helped to safeguard against arbitrary 
and prolonged imprisonment for centuries. In the United States too, the principle of habeas corpus 
has been enshrined in key legal instruments so as to “ensure that miscarriages of justice … are 
surfaced and corrected”, in the words of the Supreme Court3). With regards to Japan, the principle 
was embedded within the Constitution and the Code of Criminal Procedure (CCP) during the Allied 
Occupation led by General Douglas McArthur. As far as the Constitution is concerned, its Article 34 
states that “[n]o person shall be arrested or detained without being at once informed of the charges 
against him or without the immediate privilege of counsel; nor shall he be detained without adequate 
cause; and upon demand of any person such cause must be immediately shown in open court in his 
presence and the presence of his counsel”4). As for the CCP (which was revised in 2016 without any 
substantive changes in respect to the habeas corpus principle), Article 205 reads as follows:
(1) When a public prosecutor has received a suspect referred pursuant to the provision 
of Article 203, he/she shall give the suspect an opportunity for explanation and shall 
immediately release the suspect when he/she believes that it is not necessary to detain 
the suspect, or shall request a judge to detain the suspect within 24 hours of receiving the 
suspect when he/she believes that it is necessary to detain the suspect.
(2) The time limitation set forth in the preceding paragraph shall not exceed 72 hours of the 
suspect being placed under physical restraint.
 … 
(4) When the public prosecutor does not make a request for detention or institute 
prosecution within the time limitation set forth in paragraphs (1) and (2), he/she shall 
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immediately release the suspect.5) 
To shift attention back to the suspect, assuming that the judge has decided to issue a detention 
warrant, the question arises as to where this should be undertaken. Here, the basic legal provisions 
dictate, or at least so the majority of Japanese jurists seem to agree, that the place of detention is to 
be changed to a “penal facility” (keiji shisetsu), which fall under the jurisdiction of the MOJ, with 
the particular sub-type meant being “detention centers” (kōchisho). However, because an article 
authorizing substitution of “penal facilities” for “police station cells” also exists in a separate law, 
the issue of where to send the suspect becomes less straightforward. Since it is the judge who has 
discretion as to whether detention is to be granted at all, it is understood that the choice of detention 
place too falls within their purview and is to be determined, similarly, on a case-by-case basis. 
With regard to the CCP, it does not commit suspects against whom a detention warrant has been 
issued to remand in penal facilities. Indeed, neither the revised 2016 version of the CCP nor the 
one promulgated during the Occupation period (in 1948), make an explicit link between suspects 
(higisha) and “penal facilities”; such a link is made only for defendants/accused (hikokunin), 
suggesting that the facility-transfer only has to happen when formal charges are pressed by the 
prosecution and the “suspect” becomes a “defendant”. The specifi c Article from the Code that is 
referred to here is No.64 and it stipulates that:
A subpoena or detention warrant shall contain the name and residence of the accused 
[emphasis added], the crime, a summary of the charged facts, the place where the accused is 
to be brought or the penal institution where he/she is to be detained [emphasis added], the 
valid period and a statement that after expiry of the valid period the subpoena or detention 
warrant shall not be executed but shall be returned, the date of issue, and other matters 
prescribed in the Court Rules; and the presiding judge or the commissioned judge shall affi x 
his/her name and seal to it.6)
However, even if the CCP per se is silent as to the place of detention of suspects, in describing 
the purpose of “penal facilities”, the Act on the Penal Detention Facilities and the Treatment of 
Inmates and Detainees (Keiji shūyō shisetsu oyobi hi-shūyosha no shōgū ni kan suru hōritsu, 
henceforth “The Act on Penal Facilities”)7) makes it clear that this is where they ought to be 
detained. Concretely, the Act stipulates, in Article 3, that “[p]enal facilities are establishments for 
[confi ning] and the appropriate treatment of [amongst others] persons under detention pursuant to [the 
issuance of a warrant, as per] the provisions of the CCP”8), amongst whom are suspects.
Although the above-mentioned silence of the CCP makes some representatives of the police 
argue that the law does not specify any place for suspect detention, the dominant interpretation in 
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Japanese legal circles of the legal framework described so far is that its intention is for suspects to 
be transferred at this juncture to penal facilities. After all, the majority of Japanese jurists would 
say, does not the very constitutional and legal requirement of habeas corpus, which was discussed 
earlier (i.e. that anybody who has been arrested should be promptly brought to a court for hearing to 
determine if their detention is justifi ed), not make it abundantly clear that the spirit of the law is for 
police detention to be discontinued (Keiji rippō kenkyū kai 2005)? 
As for why detention centers in particular are the specific sub-type of penal facilities where 
suspects’ detention is thought to be intended, this is because their purpose is to simply temporarily 
host those within the criminal justice process who are awaiting the completion of pending 
procedures. The other two categories of detainees held in detention centers are: 1) defendants 
(who are awaiting their trial); and, death row inmates (who anticipate the Justice Minister’s 
signing of their execution order). This type of penal facility is thus quite different in nature from 
prisons (keimusho), which is where convicts are kept for a proactive kind of treatment – namely, 
rehabilitation so as to return to society.
Regardless of the conviction of most Japanese jurists that the intent of the legal framework 
is for suspects to be transferred on day three of detention to detention centers, the existence of a 
different provision in the Act on Penal Facilities cited earlier has had the effect of changing what 
happens actually in practice, as will be discussed in the sub-section below. The provision in question 
is Article 15 of the said act, and it stipulates that “[t]hose set forth in the items of Article 3 [No.3 
of which is ‘persons remanded on detention warrant’, which includes suspects], may be detained 
in police station cells as an alternative to penal facilities…”9). What this stipulation means in plain 
language is that substituting penal facilities for police ones is permissible, with the implication of 
this being that if this article is invoked, suspects who have undergone police detention for three days 
could legitimately be returned back to police stations for further detention until the expiry of their 
detention warrant.
2.2. The Actual Practice 
As mentioned earlier, the discretion to decide where a suspect is to be detained in each individual 
case rests with the judge. So how often does it happen in practice that Article 15 of the Act on Penal 
Facilities is invoked and a suspect is sent, instead of to a detention center, back to a police station 
cell?
To take the discussion a step back, when applying for detention warrants, prosecutors in Japan 
tend to request that the detention is continued in police station cells, as opposed to detention centers. 
In the majority of cases their request is granted. This prosecutorial tendency is often discussed in 
Japanese language articles on this topic, but a particularly convincing verifi cation that it really exists 
occurred during the negotiations between the MOJ, the National Police Agency (NPA) and the Japan 
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Federation of Bar Associations (JFBA) that preceded the 2006 revision of the Prison Law, where the 
issue of facility substitution became arguably the hottest point of contention (Miketsu kōkinsha no 
shogū ni kan suru yūshikisha kaigi 2006)10). 
The reason typically given by prosecutors for this preference of facilities is that detention there 
is necessary for ensuring the smooth and effi cient progression of the investigation, which would not 
be the outcome if the alternative arrangement is followed. To corroborate their claim, prosecutors 
further cite several other aspects of the two types of facilities: fi rstly, they argue that police station 
premises are better equipped for questioning (in terms of having sufficient number of rooms 
with, for example, special windows through which the suspect cannot see but their actions can be 
observed by investigators or witnesses standing on the other side); secondly, they highlight that 
police stations are more centrally- and conveniently-located compared to the often remote detention 
centers, and because prosecutors are operating under time-constraints, the investigation of the case 
would be best served if they spend the shortest possible time to reach the suspect.
It should be noted that the period of police detention which would result from the judge granting 
the prosecutors their preference is 23 days, with the amount of days being authorized at the point 
of suspect’s court presentation being 10, and a possibility existing for a further 10-day extension. 
However, this is only for one suspicion. In practice, multiple suspicions can be raised, with the 
suspect being re-arrested prior to the end of the 23-day period, so that the same process starts all 
over again. Furthermore, because there is no legal limit as to the total number of charges that could 
be invoked in concession, it is theoretically plausible that the suspect is detained in police cells 
indefi nitely.
That Japanese judges rarely see the return of suspects to police cells as problematic is attested by 
the statistic of near-100% continuous detention there. Relying on MOJ data submitted to the Diet, 
Croydon explains that: 
On any given day in 2004, for example, as many as 98 per cent of the approximately 
5,500-strong population of suspects were being detained in police cells (this rate has grown 
steadily over the past thirty years from approximately 3,000 …). Moreover, whilst arrestees 
are held in police cells as a matter of course, on a suspect’s presentation to a judge, the 
investigative authorities request in 93 per cent of cases that the suspect be returned to police 
detention facilities afterwards. This request is almost always granted so that suspects are 
detained beyond the initial three-day period into the fi rst period of extension, and in 54 per 
cent of cases there is a further extension into the second. (Croydon 2016: 150-153).
Furthermore, from her fi ndings it is also clear that multiple suspicion charges are indeed often 
applied, making the average detention of suspects in police cells in practice greater than 23 days. 
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Specifi cally, she reports from the NPA data that “in 2010 the average period of detention for each 
arrestee in police cells was as great as 26.3 days (and has been even higher over the previous 
decade).” “In particular”, she continues, “over the years 2006–9, the average number of days was 
28.0, 27.4, 27.3, and 26.9, respectively” (Ibid.: 3).
With Article 15 of the Act on Penal Facilities was relied on extensively in the post-Occupation 
era (for reasons that will be outlined below), the facility-substitution became an established practice 
and it has since become known as “substitute prison” (daiyō kangoku). When the Prison Law was 
revised in the mid-2000s, the word “prison” (kangoku), whose equivalent in English could be said to 
be “gaol”, was abolished in favor of the modern word “penal facilities” (keiji shisetsu or sometimes 
keiji shūyō shisetsu). However, since substantively the Act on Penal Facilities kept the status quo, 
experts critical of the practice and familiar with its roots continue to refer to it pejoratively as 
“substitute prison” (e.g. for a most recent example see: Takeuchi & Kitoh 2018). 
3. A Brief History of the Facility-substitution Article
Whilst it is clear from the introduction of the legal framework above that the police facilities 
would be used only as a replacement of detention centers in exceptional circumstances, it remains 
unclear how and why this policy of substitution was incorporated as well as what factors account for 
its persistence to this date. This section provides a concise account in this regard. It cites evidence 
that demonstrates the facility-substitution practice was meant to neither expand to the extent that it 
has, nor to last for more than a few years.
At the point when the article permitting the use of police cells instead of detention centers 
entered the law (that is, the Prison Law) in 190811), its aim was merely to serve as a stop-gap 
measure that would alleviate a shortage of infrastructure. This was a period characterized by rapid, 
heavy borrowing from abroad and major structural reorganization for Japan, with the Meiji oligarchs 
seeking to replace a feudalistic system of criminal justice, amongst other frameworks of governance, 
with a codifi ed one modelled on those of leading Western nations. As a new French-based Code 
of Criminal Instruction (Chizai Hō) was adopted in 1880, fresh demands were imposed on the 
detention system, with, concretely, a preliminary investigation stage requiring that defendants are 
held in close proximity to the courts, so as to facilitate the pre-trial investigation of the preliminary 
judge (Ishii 1958). However, it was deemed impossible to accommodate this requirement using the 
existing detention centers (known as kōchikan at the time), since there were not enough of them, 
with the focus hitherto having been on developing a network of large central prisons. To fi ll this 
gap, and also for the planned transfer to take place of jurisdiction of prisons and detention centers 
from the Home Ministry (which had become overburdened) to the MOJ, it was decided to permit on 
a temporary basis the use of police station facilities (ryūchijo) as a replacement of detention centers 
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(Daikasumi kai 1971; Niwayama & Igarashi 1981; Röhl 2005). The former type of facilities, i.e. 
police station ones, had become ubiquitous due to Home Minister Aritomo Yamagata’s authoritarian 
orientation.
The separation between policing and prison administration through transferring of the 
jurisdiction of prisons and detention centers from the Home Ministry, wherein the police force was 
managed, to the MOJ could be understood as part of Japan’s attempts to Europeanize its criminal 
justice system. Having convinced a number of Western powers that its legal system was “suffi ciently 
modern and civilized”, achieving, for example, in 1894, a coveted abolition of the extraterritoriality 
treaty with Britain (Cassel 2012), the Japanese oligarchs were determined to maintain their “modern 
nation” status and were even playing their own civilization politics vis-à-vis several of their 
neighbours (Botsman 2007). In the midst of this, the debate occurred in parliament and legal circles 
as to whether the policy of using police cells for the detention of pre-trial detainees is appropriate. In 
particular, a MOJ offi cial, Shigeo Wakayama, as well as several lawyers raised the concern that this 
practice would permit the abuse of the police known from the past to continue (Croydon 2016: 44-
46). 
Over the ensuing years it was incumbent upon the MOJ to expand the network of detention 
centers that it was bequeathed from the Home Ministry after the jurisdictional transfer. Although the 
MOJ duly attempted to do so, due to budgetary constraints the expansion of physical infrastructure 
that it could achieve was very limited (Igarashi 1989; 1991). Furthermore, as the modernization 
of the criminal process continued, with an ever increasing number of localities using preliminary 
procedure, the dependence on police cells for the detention of pre-trial detainees failed to be 
resolved and, one could argue, became even worse. 
These developments notwithstanding, by the time of the enactment of the Prison Law the 
replacement of detention center cells for police cells in pre-trial detention cases was hardly the most 
pressing issue in terms of human rights within the Japanese criminal justice system. As suggested 
already, the police was gaining increasingly power and a number of legal tools were promulgated 
that would enable it to not only summarily detain individuals for extended periods of time but 
to also sentence and imprison them in police cells without any recourse to the basic criminal 
procedure. The reduction in value for the Home Ministry of prisons/detention centers as tools for 
maintaining social control relative to the powers that those new tools afforded it was arguably why 
it decided to relinquish the jurisdiction of these facilities to the MOJ. Even though with labour and 
socialist movements on the social scene there was a danger of chaos, the Home Ministry no longer 
needed control of detention facilities to retain order. To begin with, 1886 saw the enhancement of 
the political wing of the police’s powers, with the establishment of a Higher Police (Kōtō Keisatsu) 
section (Tipton 1990; 1997). The following year, the Peace Preservation Ordinance (Hōan Jōrei), 
which included provisions to prevent uprisings and social order disturbance and which were 
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implemented with vigor (Smethurst 1974; Jansen and Hall 1989), was put into force. Two further 
laws were passed in 1900 – the Administrative Enabling Law (Gyōsei Shikko Hō) and the Public 
Order and Police Law (Chian Keisatsu Hō), which both gave the police legal grounds for arresting 
individuals without recourse to the CCP (Aldous 1997). Moreover, on the same day when the 
Prison Law was passed, the Police Crimes Punishment Ordinance (Keisatsu-han Shobatsu Rei) was 
enforced by the Home Ministry. Together with the Summary Trial Regulations for Police Offences 
(Ikeizai Sokketsu Rei), the latter statute enabled police chiefs to impose an immediate imprisonment 
on an individual, for up to 30 days, with the implementation of this penalty taking place in police 
cells (Ames 1981).
The law-enforcement officers of Taisho and the war period utilized the facility-substitution 
option to an extent. However, this was mainly for the detention of prisoners the police had 
themselves convicted. It was not until after the departure of the Allied Forces that the provision 
in question came to be relied on more heavily for pre-trial detainees. What is in the background 
of this change is General McArthur’s stripping of the police of their former powers. To elucidate, 
during the Occupation, the stature of the police was greatly reduced, with the special branches that 
had played a role in Japan’s militarization and suppression of opposition having been abolished. 
Furthermore, all the legal statutes giving special authority to the police with regards to arrest and 
trials were also repealed. Relatedly, the CCP was revised to introduce the aforementioned principle 
of habeas corpus precisely with the goal of serving as a safeguard against arbitrary and prolonged 
police detention – something which, as Sissions discusses, had often produced cases of forcefully 
extracted false confessions (Sissions 1959).
Upon departure from Japan, the Allied Forces were no doubt confi dent that all the legal measures 
were in place to prevent future police malpractice with respect to criminal detainees. However, even 
though the list of the safeguards they had introduced was extensive, room still remained for abusive 
police practices to occur. Indeed, the Prison Law’s facility-substitution provision, which most likely 
had simply evaded the attention of McArthur’s legal aides (Sato 2005), permitted the investigative 
authorities to continue to hold suspects beyond the new compulsory day-three presentation to a 
court of law. By utilizing this provision, suspects could be returned back to police station cells after 
their meeting with a judge. With this signifi cantly extended period of time under the control of the 
investigation, suspects remained vulnerable vis-à-vis the police. As far as the latter is concerned, 
the pre-war practice could continue of investigating the suspect with the goal of producing a guilt-
confi rming affi davit that would serve in court (kyōjutsu chōsho).
As a result of the said Prison Law article remaining untouched in the midst of many legal 
changes that restricted the police’s authority with respect to the criminal investigation process, 
the scene was set for the substitute prison reliance to grow. The police, indeed, did not shy away 
from availing itself of this article. It gradually began utilizing it to an extent that made continuous 
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detention of suspects in police station cells the norm.
4. Stakeholders’ Attitudes toward Facility-substitution
The eagerness of the investigative authorities to take advantage of the facility-substitution 
provision as an investigative tool was indeed what drove the expansion of this practice. However, 
the latter would not have happened had the major stakeholders been in opposition. This section 
is devoted to describing the enabling environment in which the substitute prison entrenchment 
occurred.
To start with the MOJ, and the Correction Bureau (CB) in particular (wherein the proper 
jurisdiction precisely lies over the detention of suspects), it appears to be helpful and convenient for 
it that the NPA is keen to take on some of the responsibility of suspect detention. This is because 
the CB could thus focus more of its resources on managing the convicted prisoners’ population, for 
which facilities are insuffi cient. As Igarashi has found, with prisons being chronically overcrowded 
and operating over capacity, it has been useful for the CB to convert some of the detention centers 
into premises for convicted prisoners (Igarashi 1989, 1991). With the NPA volunteering to share the 
duty of suspect detention, not only can the CB feel less pressure to supply the quantity of detention 
cells adequate for the demand that the criminal justice process produces, but it can also transform 
detention centers into prisons. Since this has become an identifi able tendency, as Igarashi describes, 
the number of detention centers has decreased considerably. Indeed, detention centers are becoming 
a rarity, especially in more central urban locations.
With regards to politicians, there seems to be a low incentive for them to proactively seek to 
divert sparse resources from the NPA to the MOJ. The lack of motivation for politicians in this 
direction, and indeed their inaction, could be said to be a function of the images the two agencies 
hold in the public mind. Whilst the former is generally considered to be the “citizens’ guardian”, the 
latter tends to be associated simply with convicted criminals. This mirrors local attitudes towards 
the facilities of these two agencies – the NPA fi nds it easy to receive approval to build new premises 
in residential areas, whereas the MOJ struggles to overcome “not in my backyard” opposition. 
For the ruling party politicians, then, to initiate a diversion of resources from the NPA to the MOJ 
would be a publicly unpopular move that could result in loosing votes. This electoral disincentive 
could explain the hands-off stance of the legislature when it comes to securing MOJ facilities for all 
suspect detainees.
As for the lawyers, although the JFBA’s offi cial position is that facility substitution should be 
abolished, in private many individual members of the bar seem to take a diverging stance. This lack 
of unanimity within the lawyers’ organization means that their ability to lobby for the elimination of 
the facility-substitution practice is compromised. More specifi cally, lawyers are concerned about the 
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diffi culty of paying regular visits to their clients if the latter were to be detained in far-off detention 
centers, as opposed to the centrally-located police stations (Croydon 2016: 160-5). Indeed, police 
station cells tend to exist in large numbers across central and residential city areas, in contrast to 
the very few and remote MOJ facilities (for reasons to do with the aforementioned issue of public 
popularity of the NPA relative to the MOJ). For purposes of visitations then, and from convenience 
perspective, the placement of suspects in police station cells is much more attractive as an option for 
lawyers than remanding them in detention centers. Granted, the danger exists in police cells that the 
suspect might be subjected to an interrogation marathon that is diffi cult to withstand, with a false 
confession that could work against them in court being the result. However, in many lawyers’ views, 
this danger appears to be offset by the more effective counsel they could give to their clients through 
more regular visitations.
With the major stakeholders being in tacit approval of this pre-indictment detention system, a 
positive feedback mechanism has been created which makes abolition seem unrealistic. Concretely, 
the more the system is used, the greater the number becomes of the detention center cells that would 
be necessary in the future to do without it. Indeed, the transition that might have seemed quite 
challenging at the turn of the 20th century (i.e. of installing in one fell swoop the amount of detention 
center cells that would accommodate the new CCP), today seems near impossible. As Croydon 
states, “[e]ven those wanting to take a hard line in opposition to the system [are now] harbor[ing] an 
increasing sense that campaigning for its end is swimming against the tide, with many viewing the 
system as a pragmatic inevitability” (Ibid.: 173). 
On a fi nal note, the sense of resignation with the status quo has been exacerbated by the fact 
that prefectural authorities have also provided financial resources to the police for bolstering 
their detention cell infrastructure. In other words, the gap in facilities of the MOJ and the NPA is 
growing not only on account of the former converting detention centers into prison premises, but 
also because the cell network of the latter has been expanded with the help of prefectural funds. 
One recent example of such a prefectural project is the construction by the Tokyo metropolis of a 
300-capacity police detention facility in Harajuku.
5. Concluding Discussion
This article has offered a discussion of Japan’s pre-indictment detention focusing on the relevant 
legal statutes and the actual resultant practices. It has emphasized that the overwhelming mass 
of suspects in Japan, who do not enjoy the special attention given to the recently befallen Nissan 
CEO Carlos Ghosn, go through the criminal investigation process, right up until indictment, whilst 
confi ned by, and within the control at all times of, the police. The possibility which this raises for 
the occurrence of miscarriages of justice is a topic that is conspicuously missing from ongoing 
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discussions about the Japanese criminal justice process.
While in times of quiescence commentators can be excused for not knowing about, or failing 
to draw attention to, the facility-substitution practice with archaic roots described in this article, 
one can only wonder why this practice continues to be an esoteric knowledge at a moment when so 
much discussion is generated about Japan’s detention system. For those who wonder why Ghosn 
was sent for detention to the Tokyo Detention Center and not to a police station, there exist no 
special legal provision that says suspects arrested by the Special Investigation Department of the 
Public Prosecutor’s Offi ce, as opposed to the police, have to be remanded in the MOJ’s detention 
centers; the same rules that apply for suspects arrested by the police apply also for those arrested by 
the prosecution. True, as someone on whom preliminary investigation had already been undertaken 
prior to arrest (due to his reported implication in plea bargaining), Ghosn was to be questioned 
from the very start by the prosecution only, with the stage of the police doing this during the fi rst 48 
hours upon arrest being skipped. For that reason, one could legitimately conclude that there was no 
particular reason for the judge to send him to a police facility for remand. Still, there is nothing in 
the law that could have precluded the prosecutor in Ghosn’s case to petition for detention in a police 
station on the same grounds on which this is usually done – i.e. for the purposes of the convenience 
and smooth implementation of the investigation. After all, with Article 15 of the Act on Penal 
Facilities in place, substitution of detention centers for police cells is perfectly legal whichever the 
arresting authority is. And as for convincing reasons to request such substitution, let us not forget 
that Ayase, where the Tokyo Detention Center, is located is much further away from the Public 
Prosecutor’s Offi ce at Kasumigaseki 1-chōme than, say, Harajuku. This is not to mention that access 
to Ghosn by the prosecutor while he is detained in the Tokyo Detention Center would be constrained 
to this facility’s opening times during the day (for reasons to do with availability of staff). In 
contrast, a government department such as the police is in operation late in the evenings and even 
at nighttime, due to the nature of its duties, some of which are to remove from the streets drunkards 
and individuals behaving in an anti-social way.
So, one is led to consider what was the motivation for Ghosn’s current location of detention. 
How indeed should one interpret the placing by the Tokyo District Court of the high-profile 
suspect Ghosn within the 2% portion of instances where detention is undertaken as intended by the 
foreigners who installed Japan’s CCP? Is it a coincidence that this particular case fell within that 
small segment of cases? 
Certainly one player that has not acted typically in this case is Tokyo District Court. In 
December 2018 in particular, this Court took the unusual step of refusing the prosecutor’s request 
for extension of detention on the second arrest of Ghosn. This being the case, one also questions the 
initial motivation for the Court’s decision that Ghosn is placed in Tokyo Detention Center, rather 
than a police cell. Could one extrapolate that the Court is doing its bit to try to preserve the facility-
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substitution system, which some cynical observers see as being in the interest of the courts as well, 
as the confessions that come through its use make those criminal cases fully resolved in the public 
eyes? Was the court reacting to a perceived threat that Ghosn’s case might destroy the equilibrium 
of Japan’s criminal justice?
If the goal with sending Ghosn to Tokyo Detention Center was to shield the facility-substitution 
system from exposure, then from the state of the reports in the media so far it could be said that 
this aim has been fulfi lled. With the suspect in this case being remanded in a detention center from 
the start, the possibility did not exist for the investigation to apply pressure on him to confess by 
interrogating him continuously at free will. The prosecution then indicted quickly, as arguably 
maintaining some access to Ghosn and a momentum towards a possible admission of guilt was 
preferable to dropping the case. As a result of Ghosn’s quick change of status from a “suspect” to 
a “defendant”, the public debate soon settled on the issue of his bail and the overall length of his 
detention since arrest as the main aspect that merits discussion. And so the facility-substitution 
practice, and the reality of most suspects in Japan, remained an obscured aspect of the country’s 
criminal justice system.
Notes
1) This is the author’s translation of Kukimoto’s words. For the original, see: “Gōn zen-kaichō no 
kōryū ‘mondai nai’: Chiken kanbu ga hihan ni hanron” [Former Director Ghosn’s Detention 
Is ‘Unproblematic’: The District Prosecution Counters Criticism]. Asahi Shimbun (digital). 29 
November 2018. Retrieved on 26 December 2018 at:
https://www.asahi.com/articles/ASLCY6G3XLCYUTIL049.html.
2) The full phrase from Latin is habeas corpus ad subjiciendum and it translates as “you shall have 
the body to be subjected to examination”, with “the body” meaning “the suspect”.
3) Hensley v. Municipal Court, San Jose Milpitas Judicial District, Santa Clara County, California, 
411 U.S. 345, 349-50.
4) This is the offi cial translation published by the Prime Minister and his Cabinet and is available at:
https://japan.kantei.go.jp/constitution_and_government_of_japan/constitution_e.html. Retrieved 
23 January 2019.
5) This translation is by the Japanese MOJ and can be accessed at:
http://elaws.e-gov.go.jp/search/elawsSearch/elaws_search/lsg0500/detail/323AC0000000131_2
0170713_429AC0000000072/0?revIndex=4&lawId=323AC0000000131. Retrieved 23 January 
2019.
6) This is again the MOJ’s translation. Accessed 23 January 2019 at: 
http://www.japaneselawtranslation.go.jp/law/detail/?id=2056&vm=04&re=02.
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7) This is the 2005 reincarnation of the 1908 Prison Law (Kangoku Hō).
8) MOJ translation, accessed on 23 January 2019 at:
http://www.japaneselawtranslation.go.jp/law/detail/?id=2796&vm=04&re=02.
9) This is the author’s translation. The original Japanese text can be found at: 
h t t p : / / e l a w s . e - g o v . g o . j p / s e a r c h / e l a w s S e a r c h / e l a w s _ s e a r c h / l s g 0 5 0 0 /
detail?lawId=417AC0000000050. Retrieved on 12 January 2019.
10) For an example of what a detention warrant looks like see: http://www.akagi-law.tokyo/pc/
privacy/privacy47.html. In this particular sample warrant, provided by a law fi rm, the place of 
detention specifi ed by the Tokyo District Court is also a police facility – the Tokyo Metropolitan 
Police itself.
11) In the Prison Law the facility-substitution provision was Clause 3 of Article1. The exact text of 
that law can be found at: http://roppou.aichi-u.ac.jp/joubun/m41-28.htm. Retrieved on 6 February 
2019.
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Protecting the Equilibrium of Japan’s Criminal Justice System:
How Carlos Ghosn’s Case Failed to Highlight a Fundamental Aspect
of the Japanese Pre-Trial Detention System
Silvia CROYDON
This study was motivated by the recent debates on Japanese criminal justice that were 
prompted by the arrest and detention of the Nissan Corporation’s former executive Carlos Ghosn. 
Ghosn’s detention triggered a diplomatic row that has come to threaten established economic 
ties. The exchanges that are now taking place between Japanese and Western government 
representatives regarding Japan’s criminal justice system closely resemble those of the era of 
imposed extraterritoriality on Japan. On the one hand, the former celebrity executive’s foreign 
fans, and other commentators are condemning the Japanese justice system as disrespectful of basic 
human rights because it has deprived a man, who at this time must still be considered innocent, of 
liberty for months. On the other hand, the Japanese are defending their justice system by arguing 
that it has followed a different trajectory than that of its European counterparts, and just because 
it diverges in certain respects from their system, does not mean it is inferior. What remains out 
of focus in these discussions, however, is that, unlike in the high-profile case of Ghosn, who 
was detained to a facility neutral of the investigation process (the Ministry of Justice’s Tokyo 
Detention Center) just as the criminal procedure dictates, average criminal suspects in Japan are 
often detained in police station cells pre-indictment. This study attempts to shift the focus of the 
discussion away from the aberrant case of Ghosn and onto the reality of Japan’s average criminal 
suspect.
Key words: Criminal justice, Suspect, Police, Detention, Investigation, Japan
